The Paget Papers.

Letter from Lord Minto to the Hon. Arthur Paget (Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the King of the two Sicilies).

Source: Paget, Right Hon. Sir Augustus B. Paget, G.C.B. The Paget Papers, Diplomatic and other Correspondence of the Right Hon Sir A. Paget. G.C.B., 1794-1807, 2 Vols. Longmans, Green and Co. New York 1896. Vol 1.  Pages 225-228.

Vienna, 27th May, 1800.

The Campaign has been uniformly successful in Italy. A very masterly plan has been executed with great spirit, activity, and courage, and is on the point I trust of being crown'd with the capture of Genoa & the extinction of Massena's army, which is all that remains of the Italian war since the remainder of the French army of Italy has been driven fairly across the Var. Melas after Nice was in his possession determined to draw a considerable part of his troops, especially cavalry, to Turin, partly for the greater facility of subsistence, & partly with a view of meeting Berthier who was reported to be approaching Italy with about 10 or 15,000 men by the way of Switzerland. Melas was under no uneasiness at this attempt to relieve Genoa ; & can oppose a superior force to Berthier without diminishing that which invests Genoa. We have read the accounts of the surrender of Savona this day, & if the Austrians are not much deceived Genoa must in all probability be already in their possession. It is to this event that we are looking with impatience for the means of restoring that superiority in Germany which the Austrians have lost for some weeks in that quarter. The campaign open'd there with an incursion of the enemy by Kehl & Brissac. This first movement seems to have been a feint, for they soon retir'd without attempting anything material, but they pass'd at the same moment higher up between Schaffhausen & Stein ; & there Mr. Wickham shall take the story up. . . . .
By the latest accounts things continued on the same footing, that is to say, the two armies almost in presence near Ulm. On the 19th the French pass'd in force to the left bank of the Danube & seem'd to indicate an intention of bringing on a general battle. But on Kray's making disposition accordingly, they judged it expedient to decline the action & to repass the river. However in this situation a battle seems every hour probable, & I have every reason to think it must be fought in circumstances advantageous to the Austrians. In the meanwhile it is with real comfort & satisfaction that I can assure you of the steadiness of this court, & I cannot too much commend the tone of firmness & courage which was display'd in the moment of these reverses, notwithstanding the advantage which the Peace faction was desirous to take of them. I see no ground for apprehending a weak resolution at Vienna except that which, tho' it will come immediately from the North, may be consider'd as originating in a great degree in Italy. I mean the possibility of Russian indisposition * towards Austria being push'd so far as to make the latter apprehend actual hostihty either during the war, or in the period of weakness which immediately succeeds it. This apprehension if it became serious would, I fear, drive the Emperor into a premature peace with France, in which the interests of Italy would be the last object he would attend to. A principal cause of the irritation which the Emperor perhaps discovers towards several of the Italian powers, is an opinion that the indisposition of the Emperor of Prussia has been very much fomented by the complaints of those powers.† I do not know that this has been the case, but from the nature of the thing I think it likely enough to have been so. This at all events is the opinion entertain'd here. As I have j ust said such complaints might be natural enough ; but I feel anxious to impress on the minds of all those who are connected with the affairs & interests of Italy, the impolicy of widening the breach, or promoting a rupture between the two Imperial Courts. Italy, like the rest of the world, depends on the success of this war. That success would be ensured by the Union of the Allies, & may be frustrated by their alienation from each other.
A Peace between the Emperor & France, as I have reason to know, would be wholly at the expense of Italy. If the influence of Russia is really desired for the protection of the Italian Princes, that influence can be rendered considerable only by establishing a good understanding between the two Emperors, & must be rendered null by their rupture. On what ground can the Empr of Russia demand sacrifices from the Emperor while he refuses to contribute in any degree to the changes & hazards of the war, & professes an open & violent enmity to the Emperor.
It is the clear interest of all those states who would avail themselves of the good disposition of Russia for their protection, to mediate in the differences between the Emperors, & to reconcile them as speedily & as effectually as possible. This leads me to mention a good deal of jealousy which I have observed here concerning the mission of the Prince de Belmonte to Petersburg, as if it might be intended to encourage the jealousies already conceived there agt the Emperor of Germany. And if a more useful & political turn can be given to that Mission I cannot help thinking that a service will be render'd to Naples as well as to the rest of Italy. If I were to hazard an advice, in that pure affection & solicitude for the Court of Naples which I most sincerely assure you, & them, is by no means diminish'd in my breast, it would be to conciliate if possible the Emperor of Germany rather than rely exclusively on the Emperor of Russia. The first by his position on the map can evidently do much more to serve or hurt them than the other. They will say it is impossible, because the views of Austria are inconsistent with their safety. I can only say that this is not yet known to me. The Emperor will I believe keep the Three Legations,#. but he disclaims in the strongest manner any further views on the papal territory, or any that would bring him nearer to Naples. The Emperor feels much dissatisfaction at the King of Naples keeping his troops at Rome under the idea of restraining him from the acquisition of the three Legations ; & I am seriously alarm'd lest some violent resolution should be taken if this sort of contest should continue ; as I am uneasy concerning the consequences of so unequal a contest, But I may venture to say that you may depend on the Emperor's having no views himself either on Rome or any other part of its territory, still less on Naples. I do not speak on this point without authority. Another ill effect of the rupture with Russia has been the diminution of the power of England to interpose in behalf of the smaller states ; for the retreat of Russia from the war makes it the more indispensable to keep Austria up to it, & therefore the more difficult to contend with her on any point whatever. If the safety of all depends now solely on the exertions of Austria against hrance, that exertion must be purchased by some sacrifices & by some inducements or other, & so far as I atn acquainted with her views, tho' there may be something to regret, I must sincerely say there is nothing to alarm other nations, & certainly nothing at all comparable to the danger that must result from establishing the French Republick.-Believe me ever, my Dear Sir, most sincerely & affectionately yours,

Minto.

* After the recall of Snvarow from Italy and disastrous campaign of 1799, Russia withdrew from the alliance in Oct. 1799, charging the Austrians, on very sufficient grounds, with bad faith.
† The policy of Austria to get possession of Italy as far as the Neapolitan frontier, made her view wth great jealousy the protection extended by Russia to the Italian princes.
# The northern part of the Papal States formed the "Legations" Romagna, Ferrara, and Bologna. They were captured by the Allies in Suvaroff's campaign of 1799.

Back to the Paget Correspondence Index  
To History Menu
Home Page on this Web Site
To the Home Page